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We construct quantum mechanical observables and unitary operators which, if implemented in
physical systems as measurements and dynamical evolutions, would contradict the Church-Turing
thesis which lies at the foundation of computer science. We conclude that either the Church-Turing
thesis needs revision, or that only restricted classes of observables may be realized, in principle, as
measurements, and that only restricted classes of unitary operators may be realized, in principle, as
dynamics. [S0031-9007(97)04263-4]
PACS numbers: 89.70.+c, 03.65.BzQuantum mechanical measurements on a physical sys-
tem are represented by observables—Hermitian operators
on the state space of the observed system. It is an impor-
tant question whether all observables may be realized, in
principle, as measurements on a physical system. Dirac’s
influential text [1] makes the following assertion on the
question:
The question now presents itself—can every observable
be measured? The answer theoretically is yes. In
practice it may be very awkward, or perhaps even beyond
the ingenuity of the experimenter, to devise an apparatus
which could measure some particular observable, but the
theory always allows one to imagine that the measurement
can be made.
This Letter reexamines the question of whether it is
possible, even in principle, to measure every quantum me-
chanical observable. Unexpectedly, ideas from computer
science are crucial to the analysis. We also investigate a
related question, namely, whether it is possible to realize,
in principle, the dynamics corresponding to an arbitrary
unitary operator on the state space of a quantum system.
Of course, for specific systems particular measurements
and unitary dynamics may be forbidden by system spe-
cific features, such as superselection rules. We will not
be concerned with such specific features, but rather with
general considerations.
In the remarkable paper which founded modern com-
puter science, Turing [2] defined a class of functions
which are now known as the recursive or computable
functions. The Church-Turing thesis [2,3] of computer
science states that this class of functions corresponds pre-
cisely to the class of functions which may be computed
via what humans intuitively call an algorithm or proce-
dure. More formally, every function which can be com-
puted by what we would naturally regard as an algorithm
is a computable function, and vice versa.
The Church-Turing thesis is fundamental to theoretical
computer science, since it asserts that the mathematical
class of functions studied by computer scientists, the com-0031-9007y97y79(15)y2915(4)$10.00putable functions, is the most general class of functions
which may be calculated using a computer. It is an em-
pirical statement, not a theorem of mathematics, and has
been verified through over 60 years of testing [4,5]. For
a review of different formulations of the Church-Turing
thesis, see [4].
For convenience, we refer to computable partial func-
tions of a single non-negative integer as programs. That
programs are only partial functions means that there may
be some values of the input for which no output is defined.
An example of a program is the function fsxd ­ x2,
which may be computed using a suitable Turing machine.
Using Turing’s results, it is possible to show [6] that the
set of programs may be numbered 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . . Not all
programs need to terminate or halt for all possible in-
puts. A simple example is the program f which on input
x loops forever if x is not a perfect square, or prints
p
x
if x is a perfect square. This is an example of a partial
function.
The question of whether or not a given program,
numbered x, halts on the input of y is obviously a question
of considerable practical importance: we would like to
know whether a given algorithm will terminate or not. To
understand this question better, Turing defined a function,
the halting function h, by
hsxd ;
‰
1 if program x halts on input x ;
0 if program x does not halt on input x . (1)
Turing [2] demonstrated that the halting function is not a
computable function. That is, there exists no algorithmic
means for computing the value of the halting function
for all values x ­ 0, 1, . . . . Thus there is no algorithm
for determining whether a given program terminates
or not.
Many noncomputable functions other than the halting
function are now known, and the reasoning which follows
applies to any such function h. For concreteness we
continue to imagine that h is the halting function.© 1997 The American Physical Society 2915
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hˆ ;
‘X
x­0
hsxd jxl kxj , (2)
where jxl is an orthonormal basis for the state space of
some physical system with a countably infinite dimen-
sional state space. We will suppose that the system is
one such that all the states jxl may be prepared, in prin-
ciple. For example, the states jxl might be number states
of a single mode of the electromagnetic field. The halting
observable is clearly an observable in the usual quantum
mechanical sense: it is a Hermitian operator on the state
space of the system of interest.
Logically, one of two possibilities must hold:
(1) It is possible, in principle, to construct a measuring
device capable of performing a measurement of the
observable hˆ.
(2) It is not possible, in principle, to construct a
measuring device capable of performing a measurement
of the observable hˆ.
Suppose the first possibility is true. Then in order to
compute the value of hsxd one performs the following
procedure: Construct the measuring apparatus to measure
hˆ, and prepare the system to be measured in the state
jxl. Now perform the measurement. With probability one
the result of the measurement will be hsxd. This gives
a procedure for computing the halting function. If one
accepts the Church-Turing thesis this is not an acceptable
conclusion, since the halting function is not computable.
Acceptance of the Church-Turing thesis therefore forces
us to conclude that the second option is true, namely, that
it is not possible, in principle, to construct a measuring
device capable of performing a measurement of the ob-
servable hˆ. That is, only a limited class of observables
correspond to measurements which may be performed, in
principle, on quantum mechanical systems. An important
question arises: to determine the precise class of observ-
ables which may be realized as measurements.
Might it be possible to perform an approximate mea-
surement of hˆ? Suppose it is possible to measure an ob-
servable hˆ0 which is close to hˆ. Preparing the system
in the state jxl and measuring hˆ0, a result in the range
hsxd 6 d is obtained with probability at least 1 2 e, for
some small e and d. Clearly, by performing repeated
measurements of this type it is possible to determine hsxd
with arbitrarily high confidence. Thus, approximate mea-
surements of hˆ give an algorithmic means for computing
hsxd. Once again, if we accept the Church-Turing thesis,
then we are forced to conclude that it is not possible to
perform such an approximate measurement. Note, how-
ever, that we are implicitly using a stronger version of the
Church-Turing thesis than hitherto, since now we are re-
garding as an algorithm a procedure which outputs hsxd
with arbitrarily high confidence, rather than a purely de-
terministic procedure.2916This second conclusion should be compared to work
by Wigner [7], and Araki and Yanase [8] on the Wigner-
Araki-Yanase (WAY) theorem [9]. The WAY theorem
shows that if we require certain conservation laws to be
respected during the measurement process, then there are
restrictions on the class of observables which may be
realized using measuring devices. This is fundamentally
different to the conclusion we have obtained, which
does not depend on the imposition of externally imposed
conservation requirements. Another difference is that it
was shown in [8] and [10] that it is possible to perform
approximate measurements of the observables forbidden
realization as measurements by the WAY theorem. As
we have already seen, approximate measurements of hˆ
are not allowed by the Church-Turing thesis.
Up to this point, we have considered the physical
realization of measurements corresponding to quantum
mechanical observables. Similar arguments apply also to
the physical realization of unitary operators as dynamical
evolutions. Define a function g as follows:
gsxd ;
8>><>>:
2m 2 2 if x is themth smallest non-negative
integer such that hsxd ­ 0 ,
2m 2 1 if x is themth smallest non-negative
integer such that hsxd ­ 1 . (3)
It is easy to verify that the operator
U ;
‘X
x­0
jgsxdl kxj (4)
is unitary. Suppose we prepare the system in the state
jxl, perform the unitary dynamics U, and then do a
measurement in the jxl basis with outcome x0 (note that
there are systems where such a measurement can certainly
be done, in principle, such as a single mode of the
electromagnetic field). Note that x0 is even if and only
if hsxd ­ 0 and x0 is odd if and only if hsxd ­ 1, so
this gives a procedure for computing the halting function.
Once again, logically, one of two possibilities must hold:
(1) It is possible, in principle, to construct a system
whose dynamics is described by the unitary operator U.
(2) It is not possible, in principle, to construct a system
whose dynamics is described by the unitary operator U.
Once again, if we accept the Church-Turing thesis, then
we are forced to the second conclusion: there are unitary
operators which do not describe the dynamics of any
system which can, even in principle, be constructed. By
arguments similar to those used for observables, it is easy
to see that an approximate dynamical realization of U
can also be used as part of a procedure for evaluating
the halting function, so acceptance of the Church-Turing
thesis implies that approximate realizations of U are not
possible, either.
The examples we have discussed take place in infinite
dimensional state spaces. A similar construction for a
spin 12 system starts by defining (see chapter seven of
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references)
V ;
X
x:hsxd­1
1
2x
. (5)
Note that 0 , V , 1, and that the xth bit in the binary
expansion of V is one if and only if hsxd ­ 1, so knowing
the binary expansion of V is equivalent to knowing hsxd
for all x. Define U ; exps2iVsyd. Starting the system
in the j 12 , 12 l state (spin up in the z direction) and applying
the dynamics U we see that the state after the dynamics is
cossVd

1
2
,
1
2
À
1 sinsVd

1
2
, 2
1
2
À
. (6)
By repeatedly performing this procedure and making mea-
surements of sz we may determine cossVd and thus V to
any desired accuracy, with arbitrarily high confidence. It
follows that we can determine the value of hsxd for all
x. Once again, if we accept the Church-Turing thesis,
then we are forced to conclude that U cannot be real-
ized. Notice that, unlike the earlier examples, this pro-
cedure is not stable under perturbations of U. A slight
change in U can result in an incorrect evaluation of hsxd.
Physically, uncontrolled interactions with the environment
will necessarily mean that U is not implemented exactly,
and thus it is not possible to evaluate the halting func-
tion using a dynamical realization of U. Based on similar
arguments it seems likely, though I know of no rigor-
ous general proof, that any finite dimensional construction
which allows evaluation of a noncomputable function is
unstable against perturbations, and therefore is not physi-
cally interesting.
Returning to the two physically interesting infinite
dimensional examples, what conclusions can be drawn?
There are two programs one might pursue.
The first program is to modify the Church-Turing the-
sis. Perhaps there exist in nature quantum processes
which can be used to compute functions which are clas-
sically noncomputable. It is far-fetched, but not logi-
cally inconsistent, to imagine some type of experiment—
perhaps a scattering experiment—which can be used to
evaluate the halting function.
Recognizing such a process poses some problems.
How could we verify that a process computes the halting
function (or any other noncomputable function)? Because
of the unsolvability of the halting problem, it is not
possible to verify directly that the candidate “halting
process” is, in fact, computing the halting function.
Nevertheless, one can imagine inductively verifying that
the process computes the halting function. One would
do this by running a large number of programs on a
computer for a long time, and checking that all the
programs which halt are predicted to halt by the candidate
halting process, and that programs predicted not to halt
by the candidate halting process have not halted. Given
sufficient empirical evidence of this sort, one could thenpostulate as a new physical law that the process computes
the halting function.
What types of modification of the Church-Turing thesis
might be considered in this program? One approach is
to exclude quantum phenomena by fiat from the area
of application of the thesis. Approaches of this type
have numerous problems. First, the boundary between
quantum and classical phenomena is rather fuzzy; where
precisely does one draw the line? Second, the approach
is ad hoc; what motivates the rejection of quantum
phenomena from the area of application of the Church-
Turing thesis? Many other modifications of the Church-
Turing might be attempted, however, we will not discuss
them here, as no fully satisfactory modification has been
found by the author.
It is the author’s conjecture that the Church-Turing
thesis is essentially correct, and that a more satisfactory
program is to address the problem of achieving a sharp
characterization of the class of observables and unitary
dynamics which may be realized in physical systems.
At least two properties must be satisfied by such a
characterization:
(1) It should be consistent with a (possibly sharpened)
form of the Church-Turing thesis.
(2) It should be clear that the measurements and dy-
namics contained in that class are, in principle, realizable,
and that all other measurements and dynamics could never
be realized, even in principle, in the laboratory.
How might one achieve such a characterization?
Deutsch [12] has proposed what he calls the Church-
Turing principle, to distinguish it from the less well
formulated Church-Turing thesis. The statement of this
principle reads:
Every finitely realizable physical system can be per-
fectly simulated by a universal model computing machine
operating by finite means.
Note that finite means here has the meaning that on
any given computation finite computational resources are
used. As for classical computers, unbounded resources
are in principle available, provided only finite resources
are used on any given computation. Finitely realizable is
being used in the same sense as we have used realizable:
in principle, the system can be constructed in a laboratory.
Given such a universal machine, the problem of study-
ing what classes of measurements and dynamics are re-
alizable is reduced to the study of properties of a single
physical system, the universal computing machine, since
that system can be used to simulate all other finitely re-
alizable physical systems. This reduction to studying the
properties of a single system may make it considerably
easier to study the classes of measurements and dynamics
which are realizable.
For example, Deutsch showed that his proposed uni-
versal computing machine cannot compute any function
which is not computable on a classical computer. Thus,
his machine cannot compute the halting function. But,2917
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sured using some physical system, then by the Church-
Turing principle the measurement could be simulated on
a universal computing machine, and the result of the mea-
surement determined. This contradicts Deutsch’s asser-
tion that such a machine cannot compute any function
which is not computable classically, and we conclude that
measurements of the halting observable are not possible,
in principle. Thus, if we accept that Deutsch’s proposed
machine satisfies the Church-Turing principle, then it fol-
lows that the halting observable cannot be measured.
What is gained by using arguments based on the
Church-Turing principle instead of arguments based on
the Church-Turing thesis, is that it may be possible to
prove the Church-Turing principle within known physical
theory, for a suitable universal model computing machine.
Unfortunately, it is not clear to this author that the theory
of quantum computation (see [13–15] for a review),
which has developed from Deutsch’s original proposal,
provides a candidate universal model computing machine.
In particular, it is not clear that the finite dimensional state
spaces accessed by quantum computers are sufficient to
simulate, with arbitrary accuracy, all the processes one
finds in nature. Natural processes may take place in
infinite dimensional state spaces, and it is has not been
demonstrated that all such processes can be well simulated
using a system with only a finite number of state space
dimensions. Regardless of whether quantum computers
satisfy the Church-Turing principle, it is certainly the
case that the specification of a universal model computing
machine satisfying the Church-Turing principle, besides
being important in its own right, would also greatly
simplify the question of characterizing the classes of
measurements and dynamics which are realizable in
physical systems.
This Letter has discussed two questions: what class of
observables may be realized as quantum measurements;
and what unitary operators may be realized as quantum
dynamics. Using concepts from computer science we
have constructed observables and unitary operators whose
physical implementation would contradict the fundamen-
tal Church-Turing thesis of computer science. We con-2918clude that the introduction of new concepts into computer
science, physics, or both, is necessary to resolve this con-
tradiction.
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